Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 10
Issue 2
SYMPOSIUM

Article 5

2002

Style Piracy Revisited
Safia A. Nurghai

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Safia A. Nurghai, Style Piracy Revisited, 10 J. L. & Pol'y (2002).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol10/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC

7/24/02 11:30 AM

STYLE PIRACY REVISITED
Safia A. Nurbhai*
INTRODUCTION
The fashion industry is an international multi-billion dollar
business, one in which sales of general merchandise and apparel
alone were estimated at $784.5 billion dollars in 1999.1 The
public today is aware of high-end designers from cable stations
and entertainment shows that center on fashion, as well as from
various magazines and Internet sites.2 Consumer knowledge of
high-end fashion spurs the demand for designer products. As a
result, style piracy—the copying of a designer’s original designs,
“thereby securing, without expense, the benefit of his artistic
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2002; B.A., Lafayette College, 1999.
The author wishes to thank Professors Leo Raskind and Claire Kelly for their
advice and guidance. She would also like to thank Murtaza and Scherie
Nurbhai, Sarah Nurbhai, Yetta Miller, and Kenneth Anand for their love,
support, and encouragement. In addition, the author wishes to thank ASCAP
for awarding a version of this note first place in the Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition and the NYSBA for awarding a version of this note second place
in the Intellectual Property Law Section’s Annual Writing Competition. A
version of this article was originally published in Volume 10, Number 3 of
Bright Ideas, Winter 2001 edition, a publication of the Intellectual Property
Law Section of the New York State Bar Association.
1
Apparel Industry Website, at http://www.activemedia-guide.com/
retailing_industry.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
2
Television stations such as the Style Channel, Metro TV, and
Entertainment Television have various shows centered on fashion design.
Metro TV airs fashion shows twenty-four hours a day during Fashion Week.
Television shows, such as Access Hollywood and Extra, critique the dresses
worn by Hollywood stars at awards shows, such as the Oscars. Magazines
such as Vogue and Cosmopolitan advertise designer fashions in each issue.
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work”3—has become more popular. In fact, style piracy has
become “a way of life in the garment business.”4 Copying, or
“knocking off,” the work of creative designers is “standard
operating procedure for many [companies] both large and
small.”5 Not surprisingly, many designers oppose “knocking
off”6 and continue to seek federal legislation to protect their
works.7
Design pirates sometimes use covert methods to uncover what
other designers are creating.8 “It is not uncommon for design
pirates to sneak into a designer’s fashion show in Paris (or raid
the studio’s trash for sketches) and have ‘knock-offs’ available in
New York the next day.”9 In Johnny Carson Apparel, Inc. v.
Zeeman Mfg. Co.,10 the plaintiff researched and developed a suit
with “a distinctive design combination [on the] pocket treatment
and stitching.”11 The designer spent substantial time and money
to create and promote this suit,12 and, as a result, the item
3

Wolfenstein v. Fashion Originator’s Guild of Am., 244 A.D. 656, 657
(N.Y. 1935).
4
J. JARNOW, M. GUERREIRO & B. JUDELLE, INSIDE THE FASHION
BUSINESS: TEXT AND READINGS 28 (4th ed. 1987).
5
Id. at 150.
6
PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY,
AND THE BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 77 (1999).
7
Rocky Schmidt, Comment, Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for
Design Piracy, 30 UCLA L. REV. 861, 862 (1983).
8
Id.; Stuart Jay Young, Freebooters in Fashions: The Need for a
Copyright in Textile and Garment Designs, 9 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP)
76, 103 n.10 (1958).
9
Jennifer Mencken, A Design for the Copyright of Fashion, B.C. INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. F. 121201 n.75 (1997), available at http://www.bc.edu/bc_
org/avp/law/st_org/iptf/articles/content/1997121201.html.
10
203 U.S.P.Q. 585 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
11
Id. at 588.
12
“One estimate of the cost of producing a ‘sample line’ is $25,000.”
Leslie J. Hagin, A Comparative Analysis of Copyright Laws Applied to
Fashion Works: Renewing the Proposal for Folding Fashion Works Into the
United States Copyright Regime, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 341, 388 n.25 (1991)
(citing Telephone Interview with Bob Berkowitz, Chairman of the Board,
Apparel Guild (Apr. 27, 1990) (documentation on file with the Texas
International Law Journal)).
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became quite popular.13 The defendant purchased one of
plaintiff’s suits, had it copied by his designers, and returned the
original suit for a refund.14 Thereafter, cheaper copies appeared
on the market.15
Design piracy is unfair to designers and detrimental to
competition. It is unfair to allow design pirates to reap the
benefits of the original designer’s creativeness, labor and risktaking:16
Copying destroys the style value of dresses which are
copied. Women will not buy dresses at a good price at
one store if dresses which look about the same are offered
for sale at another store at half those prices. For this
reason, copying substantially reduces the number and
amount of reorders which the original creators get. With
this uncertainty with respect to reorders, original creators
cannot afford to buy materials in large quantities as they
otherwise would. This tends to increase the cost of their
dresses and the prices at which they must be sold.
Reputation for honesty, style, and service is an important
asset of retailers. Copying often injures such a reputation.
A customer who has bought a dress at one store and later
sees a copy of it at another store at a lower price is quite
likely to think that the retailer from whom she bought the
dress lacks ability to select distinctive models and that she
has been overcharged. Dresses are returned and
13

See Johnny Carson Apparel, 203 U.S.P.Q. at 588.
Id. The court held that while there is a great similarity in the style of
the plaintiff’s and defendants’ suits, defendants had a right to copy the style.
Id. at 593. The decisive question was whether defendant’s methods of
promotion created a likelihood of confusion in the public mind as to the source
of the garments. Id. at 594. The court found that there was “no evidence of
actual confusion.” Id. at 595. The court found that the defendants, while
acting with an improper intent, carried out their promotional scheme in such
an inept fashion—whether deliberately or not—that plaintiff’s rights were not
disturbed. Id.
15
Id. at 595. “Plaintiff discontinued the model at least in part in response
to complaints from its dealers about cheap imitations.” Id. at 593.
16
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 364.
14
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customers are lost.17
“Recent studies suggest that industrial design . . . cannot
yield long-term rewards to innovators if the short-term profits
from successful innovation are consistently appropriated by freeriders who do not share the costs and risks of the creative
process.”18 As a result, over time, the designers whose talents
and designs are being pirated will “be driven out of target
markets by cut-throat competitors who never adequately fund the
process of design innovations.”19
Those opposed to the idea of apparel designs receiving any
type of governmental protection argue that there is both a public
welfare and an economic interest in allowing garments to be
copied and sold at a cheaper price.20 Arguably, the copyist is
satisfying a public demand by supplying consumers with copies
because the consumer is either unable or unwilling to spend the
money necessary for the originals.21 This reflects a process
known as the style cycle that has long been recognized in the
fashion industry.22
According to this theory, the wealthy class sets the fashion
trends because they wish to be distinctive.23 A second group of
consumers emulates the first group and so on down the chain.24
The lower classes buy cheaper adaptations of the styles.25
Presumably, by the time a style reaches the masses, the trend has
become commonplace and has already become abandoned by the
trendsetters.26
17

See id. at 364-65 (citing Wm. Filene’s Sons Co. v. Fashion
Originators’ Guild of Am., 90 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1937)).
18
J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the Legislative Agenda, 55 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 283 (1992).
19
Id. at 284.
20
Kenneth D. Hutchinson, Design Piracy, 18 HARV. BUS. REV. 191, 194
(1939-40).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 195.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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Although the style cycle theory still exists, modern-day
technology has given the masses access to copies of original
designs much sooner than in the past.27 With the advent of
television and the Internet, the fashions worn by the wealthy class
are seen immediately and can be copied overnight.28 While some
imitation is desirable for fashion to proliferate,29 Congress needs
to set a limit. Unless designers feel secure that they will profit
from their creations, their incentive to create new works will
dwindle.30
The Copyright Act is the appropriate form of protection for
apparel designs because “one purpose of copyright protection is
to provide equity to the artist,”31 which “allow[s] the creator of a
work of art to enjoy the rewards of his effort”32 and encourages
artistic creation.33 One of the most substantial things that design
pirates steal is the original designer’s equity because the pirates
sell imitations of the original design at cheaper prices; thus, some
have called for copyright law to be amended to include protection
for apparel designs.34
The issue of design protection is “one of the most significant
and pressing items of unfinished business” of copyright
revision.35 This note explores the history of design protection in
the United States and critiques the current state of the law as
27

Peter K. Schalestock, Forms of Redress for Design Piracy: How
Victims can use Existing Copyright Law, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 113, 115
(1997).
28
Id.
29
See Hutchinson, supra note 20, at 193.
30
S. Priya Bharathi, Comment, There is More Than One Way to Skin a
Copycat: The Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat Design Piracy of Fashion
Works, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1667, 1671 (1996).
31
See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (“Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded . . . . The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s
creative labor.’”).
32
See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 873.
33
See id. at 874.
34
See Bharathi, supra note 30, at 1670.
35
Barbara Ringer, The Unfinished Business of Copyright Revision, 24
UCLA L. REV. 951, 976 (1977).
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applied to the protection of garment designs. It also recommends
that Congress add a new chapter to Title 17 of the U.S. Code
specifically geared toward the protection of apparel designs.
Congress should extend the boundaries of copyright protection in
order to encourage the “progress of science and useful arts”36 and
to reward the efforts of fashion designers.
I. HISTORY OF DESIGN PROTECTION
A. Protection Under the Early Copyright Statutes
The Copyright Act of 1976 only protects “original works of
authorship.”37 The first copyright statute, passed in 1790,
protected only maps, charts, and books.38 Over the years,
however, copyright protection was extended to “literary works,
musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic
works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, motion pictures,
other audiovisual works, and sound recordings.”39 Since its
inception, copyright law has continued to evolve.40 Specifically,
protection has been extended as technology has advanced.41
Although three-dimensional objects were granted copyright
protection in 1870, when protection was granted to “painting,
drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and . . . models or designs
intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts,”42 the phrase
“fine arts” excluded designs of useful articles, such as apparel
designs.43 In 1909 the Copyright Act was revised, and the word
36

The Constitution expressly gives Congress the right “to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
38
1 Stat. 124 (1790).
39
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
40
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 346-47.
41
See id.
42
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1916).
43
See Young, supra note 8, at 81.
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“fine” was dropped.44 It thus appeared that useful articles could
gain protection.45 To the disappointment of fashion designers,
however, although the new law did not differentiate between
“fine arts” and arts that have a useful function, a 1910 Copyright
Office regulation did.46 Regulation 12(g) provided:
Works of art—This term includes all works belonging
fairly to the so-called fine arts. (Paintings, drawings, and
sculpture.)
Productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and
character are not subject to copyright registration, even if
artistically made or ornamented.
No copyright exists in toys, games, dolls, advertising,
novelties, garments, laces, woven fabrics, or any similar
articles.47
At the time, the prospect of protection for fashion design
seemed hopeless because garments undeniably serve a utilitarian
purpose.48 Thus, the fashion industry decided to take matters into
its own hands.49
In 1935 the Fashion Originator’s Guild of America formed a
trade association of garment manufacturers and retailers whose
mission was to protect designers from style piracy.50 Retailers
and manufacturers signed a “declaration of cooperation” wherein
they pledged to deal only in original creations.51 The Guild had
an extensive design registration bureau, and as part of the

44

See id.
In § 5(g) of the 1909 Act, “works of art; models or designs for works
of art” were listed among articles eligible for copyright protection.
46
See Young, supra note 8, at 81-82.
47
See id. at 82 (citing WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 625 (1917)). In
White v. Lombardy Dresses, 40 F. Supp. 548, 551, (S.D.N.Y. 1941), the
court said, “It may be that new designs ought to be entitled to a limited
copyright, but that remedy is with Congress.”
48
See Young, supra note 8, at 83.
49
See id. at 106.
50
See id. at 107.
51
Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461-62
(1941).
45
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enforcement procedures, the bureau sent its most potent weapon,
the little red card, to all “non-cooperating retailers.”52 Guild
members were forbidden from dealing with a red-card holder
under penalty of large fines.53
The Guild was highly effective. In fact, in 1936, the Guild
controlled 60% of the market for women’s clothes that cost at
least $10.75 and 38% of all women’s garments wholesaling at
$6.75 and up.54 Although the Fashion Originator’s Guild of
America was successful in combating design piracy, the Guild
was shut down in 1941 by the Supreme Court because its
collective practices were found to violate the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.55 Thus, the garment industry was left with the Copyright Act
of 1909 as its only source of protection.
In 1949 the Copyright Office expanded the scope of articles
to which copyright protection was available by broadening the
definition of “works of art.”56 The amendment read as follows:
§ 202.8 Works of art. (Class G)-(a) in general. This class
includes works of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware,
and tapestries, as well as works belonging to the fine arts,
such as paintings, drawings, and sculpture.57
At the time, many hoped the Copyright Office would eventually
52

See Young, supra note 8, at 107.
An extensive design registration bureau containing the designs
registered by Guild members was maintained. The [red] cards were
sent to all members from time to time bearing on their face, the name
of a “non-cooperating” retailer. Henceforth all other members of the
Guild were forbidden to deal with that retailer under penalty of large
fines.

Id.
53

Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., 312 U.S. at 463.
Id. at 462.
55
Id. at 467-68. The Court’s rationale was that the Guild’s practices
substantially lessened competition and tended to create a monopoly.
56
Cameron K. Wehringer, Dress Designs: Time Protection and
Copyrights, 50 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 824 (1958).
57
37 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1952).
54
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broaden its definition of works of art to include apparel designs
because garments contain artistic expression, but the Copyright
Office did no such thing.58 Instead, the Copyright Office and the
courts took the position that fashion’s dominant function is
utilitarian.59 Advocates for the protection of apparel designs, on
the other hand, maintained that while clothing does cover the
human body, its primary market value rests not in its function,
but in its appearance.60
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court ratified the 1949 regulation
in Mazer v. Stein,61 the leading case on the copyrightability of
useful articles. In Mazer, the Supreme Court upheld the
copyrightability of a statuette despite the fact that it had been
reproduced for mass-market distribution and sold as a lamp
base.62 The Court held that the statuette qualified as a “work[] of
art” eligible for copyright protection even though it served a
functional purpose and had been distributed as part of a utilitarian
object.63
Because the preparation of a statuette requires artistic skill,
the Court found that the statuette qualified as fine art without
defining a “work of art.”64 The Court stated that “[i]ndividual
perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit a
narrow or rigid concept of art,”65 thus leading an increased
number of industrial designers to seek protection under § 5(g) of
the 1909 Act.66 To clarify that all ornamental useful articles could

58

See Young, supra note 8, at 83.
See Wm. Filene’s Sons Co. v. Fashion Originator’s Guild of Am., 14
F. Supp. 353, 354 (D. Mass. 1936), aff’d, 90 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1937).
60
Id.
61
347 U.S. 201 (1954).
62
Id. at 202.
63
Id. at 213. The Court also held that eligibility for design patent
protection did not preclude copyright protection. Id. at 217.
64
Protection for the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 1520, 1525 (1959).
65
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214.
66
61 Register of Copyrights Ann. Rep. 12 (1958). The number of “works
of art” registered under § 5(g) of the 1909 Act swelled from 3,170 in 1954 to
greater than 5,000 in 1958. Id.
59
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not gain protection, the Copyright Office enacted Regulation §
202.10(c) to narrow the Supreme Court’s open-ended extension
of copyright protection:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the
fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped will
not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a
utilitarian article incorporates features such as artistic
sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can
be identified separately and are capable of existing
independently as a work of art, such features will be
eligible for registration.67
The “sole intrinsic function” test was applied in Ted Arnold Ltd.
v. Silvercraft Co.,68 where the court recognized copyright
protection for the casing of a pencil sharpener simulating the
appearance of an antique telephone. The court stated, “[We]
would not agree with defendant that its ‘sole intrinsic
function . . . is its utility.’ Customers are paying fifteen dollars
for it, not because it sharpens pencils uncommonly well, but
because it is also a decorative conversation piece.”69
Unfortunately, the regulation failed to address the “linedrawing
problem inherent in delineating the extent of copyright protection
available for works as applied art.”70 In fact, the “sole intrinsic
function” test continues to confuse the law.
B. The Copyright Act of 1976
The 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act codified the
Supreme Court’s holding in Mazer.71 The House Committee
report noted that “[u]nless the shape of . . . [the] industrial
product contains some element that, physically or conceptually,

67

37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959) (revoked Jan. 1, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 966
(1978), and codified in the current Act at § 101).
68
259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
69
Id. at 736.
70
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B] at 2-89
(1981).
71
See Schalestock, supra note 27, at 118.
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can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that
article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill.”72
While physical separability, in which the functional part of an
object must be physically detachable from the artistic part,73 is
quite simple to apply, conceptual separability is not.74 It is clear,
however, that the 1976 Act generally denies protection to apparel
designs because they are categorized as “useful articles” under §
101. Under current copyright law, a sufficiently original design
on fabric can be granted copyright protection;75 however, an
72

Richard G. Frenkel, Intellectual Property in the Balance: Proposals for
Improving Industrial Design Protection in the Post-Trips Era, 32 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 531, 541 (1999) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668) (alteration in original) (internal
citations omitted).
73
See id. (citing Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc.,
832 F. Supp. 1378, 1392 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding the artistic labeling of a
perfume box as physically separable from the utilitarian aspects of the perfume
itself, thereby avoiding a conceptual separability analysis.)).
74
Conceptual separability is defined as follows:
Conceptual separability means that the pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features, while physically inseparable by ordinary means
from the utilitarian item, are nevertheless clearly recognizable as a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work . . . independent of the shape of
the useful article, i.e., the artistic features can be imagined separately
and independently from the useful article without destroying the basic
shape of the useful article.
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 350 (citing Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s
Costumes Co., 721 F. Supp. 1566, 1571 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting
Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices, § 505.02)) (internal citations
omitted).
75
See Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 132
(1998) (holding that pattern designs depicting familiar objects, such as hearts,
daisies, and strawberries, are entitled to very narrow copyright protection;
however, “their registrations provide a presumption of validity, which WalMart has failed to overcome”), cert. granted, 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000)
(holding that “in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under §
43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is distinctive, and therefore
protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning”). See also Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(holding design printed upon a dress fabric is a proper subject of copyright,
both as a work of art and as a print); Dan River, Inc. v. Sanders Sale
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original apparel design receives no such protection due to its
usefulness.76 Although apparel works emphasize style and
appearance instead of utility, and even though competitiveness
turns on originality in the fashion industry, the doctrine of
conceptual separability does not provide copyright protection for
apparel.77 The prevailing opinion is that products, such as ladies’
dresses or any other industrial products, cannot be copyrighted if
they do not contain some element that physically or conceptually
can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of the
article.78
C. Title II of the Copyright Act of 1976
Over the years, numerous bills have been introduced in
Congress aimed at obtaining more protection for ornamental
designs of useful articles beyond just apparel.79 With respect to
the Copyright Act of 1976, design protection appeared as Title II
of the general copyright revision bill.80 Title II was meant to
protect the “original ornamental design of a useful article.”81
Designs that were seen as “staple or commonplace [or] dictated
solely by a utilitarian function of the article were excluded.”82
Enterprises, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
copyright protection extends to fabric designs).
76
See Schalestock, supra note 27, at 122-23 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 5653002 (Nov. 5, 1991)).
77
Leonard S. Elman, The Limits of State Jurisdiction in Affording
Common Law Protection to Clothing Designs, 11 VAND. L. REV. 501, 502503 (1958).
78
“For example, the district court in Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s
Costumes Co. noted that extending copyright protection to high fashion
designs would be ‘contrary to well established case law, Copyright Office and
historical precedent.’” Hagin, supra note 12, at 350-51 (citing Whimsicality,
721 F.Supp. at 1575).
79
See Young, supra note 8, at 103.
80
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668.
81
S. 22, tit.II, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a), 122 Cong. Rec. 3856-59
(1975), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-47 (1975).
82
Id. § 202. In an effort to win congressional approval, the three-
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Title II, the Design Protection Act of 1975, was not passed by
the House “because the new form of design protection provided
by Title II could not truly be considered copyright protection.”83
Although the House Report noted that the bill failed to
designate a specific agency to administer the system, there was a
more fundamental objection. The Department of Justice was
concerned, as was the court in Fashion Originators’ Guild of
America v. FTC,84 that Title II would create a new set of
exclusive rights, the benefits of which did not necessarily
outweigh “the disadvantage of removing such designs from free
public use.”85 To date Congress has passed no bills, but the
history of design protection and current sui generis acts, such as
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,86 provide hope that
another chapter could be added to Title 17.87

dimensional shape of wearing apparel was also excluded. Id. § 202(3).
83
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 50.
84
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
85
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 50. See also FOGA v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 at 465. The court in Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. Federal
Trade Commission issued a cease-and-desist order to the Fashion Originators’
Guild because the organization tended to create a monopoly in violation of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. The court found that the Guild deprived the public
of the advantages that flow from free competition, stating, in part, the
following reasons:
[I]t narrows the outlets to which garment and textile manufacturers
can sell and the sources from which retailers can buy; subjects all
retailers and manufacturers who decline to comply with the Guild’s
program to an organized boycott; takes away the freedom of action of
members by requiring each to reveal to the Guild the intimate details
of their individual affairs; and has both as its necessary tendency and
as its purpose and effect the direct suppression of competition from
the sale of unregistered textiles and copied designs.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Similar to the court in FOGA v. FTC, Congress
rejected Title II because “it feared creating a new monopoly for industrial
design.” See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 543.
86
H.R. 2281, reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H10, 048-64 (daily ed. Oct.
8, 1998).
87
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 577.
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Why Copyright Protection is the Best Alternative
Copyright protection appears to be the best solution to design
piracy because “the primary purpose of copyright law is to
secure ‘the general benefits derived by the public from the labors
of authors.’”88 Additionally, copyright law is flexible, and it has
already been expanded to afford architects protection in their
works.89 “Critics have observed that the VHDPA could ‘easily be
expanded’ to cover industrial design, including ‘clothing
designs.’”90 Another benefit of copyright protection is that the
application process for protection is “cheap and expeditious.”91
Apparel designs cannot effectively be patented for a number
of reasons, the most practical of which is time.92 Before the
Patent and Trademark Office will issue a patent, a search of prior
art is required, which could take several months.93 Due to the
short life of apparel designs,94 a work may have little or no
commercial value by the time a design patent is granted.95 In fact,
in Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York noted the
practical inadequacy of patent protection for dress designs
because of the short life span of designs and the rigorous

88

See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 874.
“The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) contains as a part
of it the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act (“VHDPA”).” See Frenkel, supra
note 72, at 576.
90
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 577 (citing Letter from Peter Jaszi of the
Digital Future Coalition to Pat Roberts, United States Senator 2 (Aug. 24,
1998) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)).
91
Ralph S. Brown, Copyright-like Protection for Designs, 19 U. BALT.
L. REV. 308, 310 (1989) [hereinafter Brown, Copyright-like Protection].
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Fashion designs usually have a shelf life of only a few months because
trends quickly go out of style. Id.
95
See Young, supra note 8, at 90.
89
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requirements and time involved in obtaining a patent.96 In
addition, the patent application process is expensive and
complex.97 Many designers, especially new designers, cannot
afford to apply for such protection.98 Because patent protection is
not suitable for apparel protection, fashion designers should be
able to look to some variation of copyright law for protection
against piracy and compensation for their creations.99
B. The Confusing Conceptual Separability Test
A fashion designer seeking copyright protection must
convince a judge that his design is not useful or that the useful
part of the item is separable from the artistic part.100 As a result,
“[n]umerous tests have evolved in the utility and separability
areas; however, none of these tests provides a clear, predictable
path for protection of apparel designs.”101
1. The Sole Intrinsic Function Test
Under the sole intrinsic function test, “copyright is denied to
an article if its “sole intrinsic function . . . is its utility.”102 To
96

112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). The court stated as follows:
The patent law provides for protection to those who create dresses of
novel design, Title 35 U.S.C.A. §73, now 35 U.S.C.A. §171, but as
a practical matter in many instances this fails to give the needed
protection, for designs and patterns usually are short-lived and with
the conditions and time incidental to obtaining the patent, this
protection comes too late, if at all.
Id. at 190. The court ultimately held that a copyright on a dress-design
drawing gave the copyright holder the exclusive right to make copies or
reprints of the drawing only, but no exclusive rights to produce the dress
itself; that is, the copyrightable work was the drawing, not the resulting dress
style. Id.
97
See Brown, Copyright-like Protection, supra note 91, at 310.
98
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 355-56.
99
See id. at 374-75.
100
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 544.
101
See id. at 544.
102
Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV.
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understand the current copyright analysis for industrial designs,
one must be aware of the different ways courts have interpreted
Regulation § 202.10(c). Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, the leading case
advocating the sole intrinsic function test, was decided under the
1909 Copyright Act and is key to understanding the regulation.103
In Esquire, the lower court granted copyright protection to
the designer of modern light fixtures when he brought a
mandamus action to require registration of his design.104
Copyright registration had been denied on the theory that the
fixtures did not contain “elements, either alone or in
combination, which are capable of independent existence as a
copyrightable pictorial, graphic or sculptural work apart from the
utilitarian aspect.”105 The court stated that “the lamp’s intrinsic
function was not solely its utility because the lights served to
decorate, as well as to illuminate, especially during the day,
when they were exclusively decorative.”106 The court deemed the
fixture copyrightable even though it recognized the Register’s
fear that a grant of copyright in this instance would “open the
‘floodgates’ to copyrighting ‘myriads of industrial designs of
everything from automobiles to bathtubs to dresses.’”107
While the lower court’s decision appears to give apparel
designers a glimmer of hope, since the court disregarded the
Copyright Office’s concerns about “opening the floodgates” to
tempt creators of industrial designs, this hope was destroyed
when the decision was reversed on appeal.108 Swayed by
legislative intent inherent in the fact that the seventy-odd design
protection bills introduced in Congress since 1914 had failed to
be enacted, the Register’s concern that the floodgates would
open, and the Register’s expertise in such matters, the court
1341, 1345 (1987) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1956)).
103
414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev’d, 591 F.2d 753, 795 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
104
Esquire, 414 F. Supp. at 940.
105
Esquire, 591 F.2d at 798-99.
106
Erica Lehrer, The Design of Design Law Today, 35 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 145, 162 (1988).
107
Id. (citing Esquire, 414 F. Supp. 941).
108
Esquire, 591 F.2d at 796.
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decided that the registration had been properly denied.109
The appellate court justified its reversal by stating that an
object is characterized as useful when it has “an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of
the article or to convey information.”110 This new language
narrowed the reach of the copyright statute and ruled out the
protection of articles, such as light fixtures, with dual intrinsic
functions.111 The court glossed over the notion of “conceptual
separability” as irrelevant to the case at hand.112
2. The Primary-Subsidiary Test
Under the primary-subsidiary test, copyright protection can
be granted if the design’s primary purpose is ornamental and its
utilitarian purpose is subsidiary.113 The Second Circuit’s first
major opinion discussing conceptual separability114 originated in
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,115 a case that the
Second Circuit described as being on the “razor’s edge of
copyright law.”116
In Kieselstein-Cord, the Copyright Office and the courts
granted copyright protection to the designer of ornamental belt
buckles because “the primary ornamental aspects of the . . .
buckles [were] conceptually separable from their subsidiary
utilitarian function.”117 The court went on to state that “these are
not ordinary buckles; they are sculptured designs cast in precious
metal—decorative in nature and used as jewelry, principally [as]
109

See Lehrer, supra note 106, at 163.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “useful article”).
111
See Lehrer, supra note 106, at 163.
112
Id. at 162 n.87. The court concluded that when legislative history was
viewed in its entirety, the “isolated reference” to conceptual separability
“disappears.” Esquire, 591 F.2d at 804.
113
Keith Aoki, Contradiction and Context in American Copyright Law, 9
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 335 (1991).
114
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 547.
115
632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
116
Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 990.
117
Id.
110

NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC

506

7/24/02 11:30 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

ornamentation.”118 It is difficult to understand why apparel
designs cannot get protection in light of this approach. Many top
fashion designers create garments, especially for the runway, that
are decorative in nature and principally ornamental, which
illustrates that some designs can have conceptually separable
elements.119
Copyright protection was granted to costume jewelry in
Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co.120 when the court
used a primary-subsidiary test to determine if the jewelry was
protectible under copyright law. The court stated the following:
In the case of costume jewelry, while the overall form is
to some extent pre-determined by the use for which it is
intended, the creator is free to express his idea of beauty
in many ways. Unlike an automobile, a refrigerator, or a
gas range, the design of a necklace or of a bracelet may
take as many forms as the ingenuity of the artist may
conceive.121
Jewelry is viewed as ornamental, rather than utilitarian, because
it is artistic and decorative.122 Advocates of apparel design
protection would argue that the design of a garment, like jewelry,
“may take as many forms as the ingenuity of the designer may
conceive.”123 Unfortunately, the courts have failed to recognize to
date that many garments express beauty and are often seen as
“wearable art” in today’s society.124
3. The Inextricably Intertwined Test
Another interpretation of conceptual separability has been
coined the “inextricably intertwined test,”125 wherein an article is
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id. at 993.
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 348.
134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 353 (citing Trifari, 134 F. Supp. at 553).
Trifari, 134 F. Supp. at 553.
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 352-53.
See Mencken, supra note 9.
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 548.
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denied copyright protection if the “aesthetic and artistic
features . . . are inseparable from [its] use as [a] utilitiarian
article.”126 This test evolved from a Second Circuit case, Carol
Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,127 in which the court
denied copyright protection to copied mannequins of partial
human torsos.128 The court distinguished Kieselstein-Cord on the
ground that the artistic design of the belt buckles was “wholly
unnecessary to [the] performance of the utilitarian function.”129
The court found that the artistic elements of the mannequin torsos
were “inextricably intertwined” with the torsos’ utilitarian
features, and, therefore, were not copyrightable.130 This test
makes conceptual separability such a high hurdle for industrial
design that few works, if any, could gain copyright protection.131
4. The Denicola/Brandir Artistic Judgment Test
The Second Circuit in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade
Pacific Lumber Co.132 adopted what is known as the
“Denicola/Brandir artistic judgment test.”133 Professor Denicola
stated that “the dominant feature of modern industrial design is
the merger of aesthetic and utilitarian concerns” and proposed a
sliding scale between art and utility.134 He believed that the more
126

Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d
Cir. 1985).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 418.
129
Id. at 419.
130
Id.
131
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 548 (citing Aoki, supra note 113, at
340).
132
834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
133
Robert Denicola is a professor of law at the University of Nebraska.
“He surveyed the different tests for conceptual separability and concluded that
none of the tests truly captured the purpose of separability—to divide
copyrightable art from uncopyrightable industrial design.” See Frenkel, supra
note 72, at 550 (citing Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design:
A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707,
739 (1983)).
134
See Denicola, supra note 133, at 707, 739.
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an artist is concerned with utilitarian considerations, the less right
the work has to copyright protection.135 Judge Oakes restated the
Denicola test as follows:
If design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and
functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work
cannot be said to be conceptually separate from the
utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements
can be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic
judgment exercised independently of functional
influences, conceptual separability exists.136
The court found that no conceptual separability existed because
the aesthetic aspects of a bicycle rack were the same as the
functional aspect.137
Judge Oakes’s restatement of the Denicola test has been
criticized for two reasons. First, while Professor Denicola’s
approach seems to create a sliding scale between artistic influence
and functionality, Judge Oakes seems to require that industrial
design be a result of either “artistic judgment” or “functional
influences.”138 Furthermore, the test is difficult to apply because
it requires judicial analysis of artistic judgment.139 Judges are ill
suited to assess artistic judgment because they are not necessarily
skilled in that area, and conflicting rulings are likely.140 It should
be noted, moreover, that the two interpretations of the Denicola
test potentially conflict: Professor Denicola’s interpretation
allows protection for garment designs reflecting more aesthetic
considerations than utilitarian ones, while Judge Oakes’s
interpretation of the test denies protection to articles in which
functional considerations are manifested.141
This conflict is illustrated in Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s

135
136
137
138
139
140
141

See Denicola, supra note 133, at 739.
Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145.
Id. at 1146-47.
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 551.
See id.
See id. at 552.
See id. at 551.
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Costume Co.142 and National Theme Productions, Inc. v. Jerry B.
Beck, Inc.143 In Whimsicality, the Second Circuit cited Brandir
and found that the artistic and utilitarian functions of clothing
merge.144 Thus, the court concluded that Halloween costumes
could not be protected.145 On the other hand, in National, a
California district court citing Brandir held that the function of
costumes had little to do with their design and granted the
costumes protection.146 The court went on to state that “the
Second Circuit improperly applied the Denicola test . . . which
will cause decisions to turn upon largely fortuitous
circumstances.”147 Although the interpretation of the Denicola
test in National could eventually protect garments, the standard is
largely subjective and will continue to result in inconsistent
decisions.148
In a more recent decision, Severin Montres, Ltd. v. Yidah
Watch Co.,149 a district court in California used the Brandir test
to analyze whether a watch should be afforded copyright
protection. The plaintiff, the licensee of the Gucci trademark for
the purpose of creating watch designs,150 created the Gucci-G
watch, a watch with its rectangular frame forming a threedimensional letter G,151 while the defendants made a J-watch and
an E-watch.152 The defendants claimed the frame was functional
and could not be copyrighted.153 The district court, however,
relied on National and held “where design elements can be
identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised
142

891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989).
696 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
144
See Whimsicality, 891 F.2d at 455.
145
Id.
146
See National, 696 F. Supp. at 1353-54.
147
Id. at 1353 (quoting Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1151(Winter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
148
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 551.
149
997 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
150
Id. at 1264 n.1.
151
Id. at 1265.
152
Id. at 1263.
153
Id. at 1265.
143
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independently of functional influences, conceptual separability
exists.”154
The court held that the watches were copyrightable because it
believed that the “plaintiff’s artistic expression contained enough
artistic design to be unique and protectable under the Brandir
test.”155 Under the Severin analysis, artistic apparel designs might
be protectible if certain design elements, such as the sleeve or
neckline configuration, or the cut of the garment, could be
“identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised
independently of the functional influences,” namely covering up
the body.156
5. The “Lack of Test” Approach
“Of course, having a confusing test may be better than having
no test at all. The Ninth Circuit seems to have exactly that—no
test.”157 In Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp.,158 the Ninth Circuit
merely cites the statute and its legislative history. In this case,
Fabrica sought copyright protection for a folder of carpet
samples.159 The court found that “no element of the folders . . .
can be separated out and exist independently of their utilitarian
aspects.”160 This case-by-case approach is undesirable because the
court does not clearly explain its reasoning for failing to afford
protection to the design in question, and thus fails to provide
guidance to designers.161
C. Fashion Today
Apparel designs are not ordinary useful articles, especially
154

Id. (quoting National Theme Productions, 696 F. Supp. at 1353 and
citing Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145).
155
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 553.
156
See id.
157
See id.
158
697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983).
159
Id. at 892.
160
Id. at 893.
161
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 553.
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today when apparel is meant to be admired, analyzed, and
viewed.162 In Poe v. Missing Persons,163 for example, an art
student created a “swimsuit” made of clear plastic filled with
crushed rock.164 The designer called her work a “soft sculpture”
representing a swimsuit, while the defendants characterized the
work as merely a swimsuit.165 The court held that the work could
be afforded copyright protection because it was not clear “by
looking at [the suit] whether a person wearing this object could
move, walk, swim, sit, stand, or lie down without unwelcome or
unintended exposure.”166
Raising an important issue, the Poe court stated that “given
the bizarre nature of what sometimes passes for high fashion,
there may be a legitimate issue even as to the threshold question
of utility.”167 Professor William Fryer of the University of
Baltimore School of Law observed, “[W]hat some persons
consider a costume is another person’s ordinary wear.”168
Apparel designs and costumes are often indistinguishable today,
making it difficult to determine whether a garment is utilitarian
clothing or a non-utilitarian costume.
The difficulty of distinguishing between costume and highend fashion is evident from viewing fashion shows and couture
collections.169 Many of the designs created for “appearances” are
162

See Hagin, supra note 12, at 348.
745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
164
Id. at 1242.
165
Id. at 1239.
166
Id. at 1242. Various apparel designs have been displayed in museums
to be viewed as art. See Hagin, supra note 12, at 348. Similar to the
Kieselstein-Cord belt buckles that were exhibited at the New York
Metropolitan Museum of Art, Poe’s creation was displayed at the Los Angeles
Institute for Contemporary Art. Id. In 2000, Giorgio Armani’s designs were
displayed at the Guggenheim Museum in New York City. Ogale Idudu, High
Fashion as Art: Couture in Limelight At London’s V&A—”Radical Fashion”
Goes from Simple to Wild, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Oct. 19, 2001, at 28,
available at 2001 WL-WSJE 28845671.
167
See Schalestock, supra note 27, at 123.
168
See id. (citing Comment on file at the U.S. Copyright Office, Docket
No. RM 90-7).
169
See Mencken, supra note 9.
163
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intended to make an artistic statement.170 Style, rather than
durability, is the dominant competitive factor in the fashion
industry today.171 In addition, Halloween costumes are often
designed to imitate the attire of others.172 An actor could wear an
original garment in a movie or to an award show, and copies of
that garment could be made for some to wear as a costume and
for others to wear as everyday attire.173
D. Piracy in the Apparel Industry
Design piracy in the apparel industry is a tremendous
problem. For example, the “Copycat King” Victor Costa174
grossed approximately $50 million in 1988,175 and Jack
Mulqueen176 grossed more than $200 million in 1981, mostly
from copying the creations of other designers.177 Congress has
not passed legislation that affords copyright protection to the

170

See id.
Maurice A. Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 235, 256 (1944).
172
Lane Hartill, What Costume to Wear for Halloween—Uncle Sam or
Shrek?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 24, 2001, at 14, available at 2001
WL 3738593.
173
Emily Mitchell, Couture May Not Seem So Important Anymore, Yet It
Dazzles Modern Viewers of Fashion’s Grand Past, at http://www.time.com
/time/international/1996/960122/fashion.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2001).
174
Victor Costa was a Dallas-based designer “who interpret[ed] fanciful
couture designs at lower prices. An ostrich-feather skirt with strapless sequin
top from his fall collection [sold] for $850. Add at least one zero to that
amount for the approximate price of a handmade Paris couture version.”
Elizabeth Sporkin, Paris Couture—Oooh la law!; New Passion for French
Fashion, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 1987, at 1D, available at 1987 WL 4631418.
175
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 347 (1991) (citing Bonnie Johnson,
Copycat King Victor Costa Cuts the High Costa Designer Duds, PEOPLE, Aug.
22, 1988, at 96).
176
Jack Mulqueen was an apparel manufacturer that made most of its
money from sales of garments that the company’s president readily admitted
were copies of original creations of other designers. See Schmidt, supra note
7, at 863.
177
See id.
171
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apparel industry as it has done for other industries.178 In fact,
Congress has explicitly excluded apparel designs from the
proposed bills.179 The purpose of the Design Anti-Piracy Act of
1989, introduced by Representatives Kastenmeier and Moorhead,
was to protect original designs of useful articles against
unauthorized copying.180 Representative Moorhead stated that
“[t]he bill would exclude protection for designs compose[d] of
three dimensional shapes and surfaces with respect to apparel.”181
Affording copyright protection to original apparel works
would inspire designers to be more creative and would contribute
to the “[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts.”182 Over the
years, Congress has carefully and gradually extended the reach of
the Copyright Act to include an increasing number of artistic
works.183 Since courts have found that designs on clothing may be
178

In 1984, Congress enacted a new category of quasi-copyright law to
protect semiconductor chip designs (“mask works”) when pirated computer
chip designs reached more than $100 million per year. See Hagin, supra note
12, at 347 (citing Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§
901-14 (1988)). Furthermore, when the United States signed the Berne
Convention, Congress enacted the Architectural Works Copyright Protection
Act of 1990, which extends full copyright protection to architectural works.
The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Title VII of the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5132 (to be
codified in various sections of 17 U.S.C.).
179
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 347.
180
135 Cong. Rec. E3484 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1989).
181
Id. (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
182
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 342, 368-69.
183
See id. at 348 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (“The history of copyright law
has been one of gradual expansion in the types of works accorded
protection.”)). Former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer has noted the
following:
Copyright law revision may be changing from a sexagenary event into
something resembling a continuous process. In the course of the last
twenty years, copyright has emerged as one of the most important
areas of American property law. As this society moves deeper and
deeper into that phase of economic life called “postindustrialism,” . . . the extent to which copyrightable creations are
protected by exclusive property interests can become central to

NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC

514

7/24/02 11:30 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

sufficiently original to receive copyright protection,184 it would be
appropriate for Congress to take a step further and afford the
design of original garments similar treatment.
III. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION
A. Current Copyright Protection
The United States is a signatory to the Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement, which
provides its members with minimum standards of intellectual
property protection.185 Although former President Clinton stated
that the existing intellectual property laws in the United States are
sufficient to protect industrial designs, design piracy is a big
problem in this country, and current law inadequately addresses
it.186 Because the United States has only complied with the
minimum requirements of the Berne Convention,187 foreign
fashion designers do not receive the same protection in the
United States as they do overseas.188
Under international rules, the creative works of fashion
designers are protected for a limited term under copyright law.189
national growth.
Barbara Ringer, The Unfinished Business of Copyright Revision, 24 UCLA L.
REV. 951, 976 (1977).
184
See Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d at 132
(finding that copyrights for pattern designs, which depict familiar objects, such
as hearts, daisies, and strawberries, are entitled to very narrow protection).
185
Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS
Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 357, 360 (1998).
186
See Frenkel, supra note 72, at 533.
187
Under the Berne Convention, each member state extends to nationals
of other member states the same copyright protection that it provides its own
nationals. Additionally, Berne requires each member state’s copyright laws to
meet certain minimal requirements. See Hagin, supra note 12, at 369.
188
See Bharathi, supra note 30, at 1676.
189
In the United Kingdom, a garment design will be protected as long as
it can be related back to a copyright drawing. See Schmidt, supra note 7, at
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But works that are protected in Europe do not receive the same
protection against design piracy when they are shown in the
United States.190 Thus, when European designers show their
works in the United States they are risking that the works may be
copied and reproduced for sale.191 In fact in the United States the
copier is even allowed to use the original designer’s name in the
advertisement to increase sales.192 Congress should look to
countries such as France and the United Kingdom, which provide
copyright protection to garment designs, as models and similarly
extend copyright protection to industrial designs.193
B. The Garment Design Protection Act
To extend copyright protection specifically to apparel
designs, Congress should amend Title 17 of the U.S. Code with a
new chapter, The Garment Design Protection Act of 2002.194 The
procedural provisions should follow those laid out in
Representative Moorhead’s and Representative Kastenmeier’s
version of the Design Protection Act of 1989, which was
intended to protect industrial designs.195
n.94, (citing 3 EUR. INTELL. P. REV. 163 (1981)). Under French Law,
garment designs are protected as applied art or non-functional designs and
patterns. Designs may be protected upon a showing of public popularity, even
if there is no evidence of originality. See Schmidt, supra note 7, at n.94
(citing Dalloz, Jurisprudence Generale, at Propiete Litteraire et Artistique and
Dessins et Modeles (1952)).
190
See Bharathi, supra note 30, at 1676.
191
See Mencken, supra note 9, at n.4 (citing Societe Yves Saint Laurent
Couture v. Societe Louis Dreyfus Retail Mgmt., [1994] ECC 512, 18 May
1994, (Paris) (“The French court ruled in favor of Yves Saint Laurent for
‘counterfeiting and disloyal competition’ against Ralph Lauren for copying a
black tuxedo dress that was created in 1966. Saint Laurent was awarded
$395,000 in 1994.”); PARADISE, supra note 6, at 77.
192
See Mencken, supra note 9, at n.73 (stating that a copier may mark his
clothing as being “inspired” or “copied” from a certain designer without fear
of trademark infringement or false advertising).
193
See discussion supra note 189.
194
See infra Appendix.
195
See H.R. Rep. No. 3499, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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There are several basic problems with the current copyright
law as applied to apparel designs. For example, as the Copyright
Act is written, apparel designs are not defined in § 101.196
Accordingly, garment designs should be defined in the new
chapter as “the design of a garment, including the cut of the
fabric and the overall appearance and not including the fabric
design.”197 For purposes of the Garment Design Protection Act,
an article should be deemed a “useful article” if the intrinsic
utilitarian function exceeds the garment’s intention to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information. To determine
an article’s usefulness, considerations should include the cut of
the fabric, the style, the length and the garment’s overall
appearance.198
An important feature of the Garment Design Protection Act
would be the establishment of a new office, the United States
Garment Design Protection Office (“GDPO”).199 The GDPO
would handle all the administrative functions and duties required
by the act, so as to not overburden the Copyright Office. The
administrator of the GDPO would have the responsibility of
carrying out and delegating all official duties of the GDPO. The
administrator and the subordinate officers and employees of the
GDPO would be appointed by the Librarian of Congress and
would act under the librarian’s general direction and supervision.
Furthermore, the administrator and all the subordinate
officers who would determine whether garments are entitled to
protection would be required to have a sufficient knowledge of
apparel design and would have to pass a vigorous examination,
just as patent office employees are required to have a scientific
background and pass the patent bar exam. GDPO employees
would receive the registration fees required to apply for garment
design protection.200
Additionally, A new standard of originality tailored to the

196
197
198
199
200

17 U.S.C. §101 (2000).
See infra Appendix § 1(a)(2).
See infra Appendix § 1.
See infra Appendix § 7.
See infra Appendix § 8.
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fashion industry is necessary to protect apparel designs.201 The
standard should not be high. A low originality threshold is
necessary because “the fickle nature of fashion requires that
protection be keyed to what a designer succeeds in making
currently stylish.”202
To demonstrate originality, a designer would be required to
show that his or her apparel design is not a copy of another’s
work by showing that the design is not currently registered with
the GDPO. To encourage designers to register their works, a
piracy claim could not be brought on behalf of an unregistered
work. “Upon such a showing and in return for creating (or recreating) public interest, and a current market for the design,
copyright protection would issue.”203 Unlike with patents, prior
works would not have to be submitted to the GDPO. Because the
decision-makers at the GDPO would have a substantial
background in apparel design, they would be able to make
educated decisions about whether the designs meet the originality
standard. The administrator would consider the garment as a
whole; only those garments exhibiting creativity would be
protected, while purely functional, uncreative, “two-sleeves-anda-body” designs would be denied protection.204 The
administrator’s preliminary originality and functionality
determination could be contested by an accused design pirate in
an infringement action.205
Once a design is approved for protection by the GDPO,
201

See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 876.
See id. at n.112:
Almost no garment design can ever really be considered “brand
new”: garment designs generally consist of elements already
“discovered.” “Old” elements are incorporated either in a new
combination or at a time when such elements are not generally in
vogue. Often, then, the appeal of garment designs lies solely in the
re-creation of public interest in a design from the past.
See id. at n.105.
203
See id. at 876.
204
See id. at 877.
205
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 378 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. E259, E260
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)).
202
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notice would have to be given. Notice should consist of the
words “Protected Design” or the letter “F” within a circle, the
year of the date on which protection for the design commenced
and the name of the proprietor.206 The notice would be located
and applied so as to give reasonable notice of design protection
while the garment is passing through its normal channels of
commerce. Tags affixed to the garment would fulfill this
requirement.207
If a designer knowingly attempts to deceive the public by
giving false notice, he or she would be fined up to $500 for every
offense. Any person could sue for the penalty, and in such event,
one-half of the fees would go to the person suing and the other to
the GDPO.208
Another basic problem with the current copyright law
protection as applied to apparel designs is that the period of
copyright protection—the author’s life plus seventy years209—is
inappropriate in view of the “seasonal and capricious nature of
fashion and consumer tastes.”210 As Rocky Schmidt has
advocated previously,211 a one-year term should be implemented
to provide a reasonable time period for designers to make a profit
on their designs. Since most trends go out of style after three
months,212 this time period should suffice.213
The shortened term of protection would serve several
purposes. First, it would align copyright protection with the
fickle nature of the industry.214 Second, a shortened term would
encourage courts to find infringement without fear that such a
finding would be tantamount to granting a long monopoly in the
206

See infra Appendix § 9(a).
See infra Appendix § 9.
208
See infra Appendix § 16.
209
The life of the author plus a seventy year period applies to works
created on or after January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
210
Wm. Filene’s Sons Co. v. Fashion Originator’s Guild of Am., 90
F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1937).
211
See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 877.
212
See id.
213
See infra Appendix § 5.
214
See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 877.
207
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design.215 Third, “a one-year term should provide enough time
for most designers to recover substantial ‘rewards’ for their
creations.”216 Finally, the designer would be more likely to apply
for protection if he or she believed that the courts would
effectively enforce the law.217
To ensure that the GDPO does not violate the Sherman Act,
as did the Fashion Originator’s Guild of America, this article
proposes, as has Rocky Schmidt, that a compulsory licensing
system218 be designed to limit the risk of monopolies.219 Upon
registering a design, the designer would own the design
exclusively for one month; however, upon publishing, selling, or
showing the design in public, the designer would be required to
license it. The license fee arrangement would be similar to that of
the blanket licenses for sound recordings used by the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and
Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”),220 which the Supreme Court has
found not violative of the Sherman Act.221
The GDPO would control the collection and distribution of
the licensing fees, as well as police the stores, the Internet,
magazines, and all other possible clothing distribution arenas to
215

See id.
See id.
217
Peter D. Aufrichtig, Protection for Computer Programs, 32
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 133, 174-75 (1986).
218
Under a compulsory licensing system, “once a designer ma[kes] his
designs public, the world would be free to copy them. [However,] the copyist
would be required to pay a small royalty or ‘license fee’ to the original
designer.” See Schmidt, supra note 7, at 878.
219
See infra Appendix § 6.
220
ASCAP and BMI issue blanket licenses to copyrighted musical
compositions for a fee. “Blanket licenses give the licensees the right to
perform any and all of the compositions owned by the members or affiliates as
often as the licensees desire for a stated term.” Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 1 (1979).
221
Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 19 (holding that “[a]lthough the
copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to fix prices among
themselves or otherwise violate the antitrust laws, we would not expect that
any market arrangements reasonably necessary to effectuate the rights that are
granted would be deemed a per se violation of the Sherman Act”).
216
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ensure that no copied material is being sold or displayed without
payment of the requisite licensing fees. “The compulsory royalty
system could . . . be converted into a system whereby licensing
fees fund a ‘pool’ used to bring enforcement actions and police
the use of designs.”222 A small percentage of the licensing fees
would go to the GDPO.223
If the GDPO, or another party, believes that a copier has
infringed a protected apparel design, the GDPO would notify the
designer. First, the designer may request a hearing in front of the
GDPO’s Anti-Piracy Panel (“APP”), which would hear
infringement claims. The APP would consist of lawyers trained
in intellectual property law.224 Thereafter, either party could
appeal the APP’s decision by bringing a civil action in district
court.
When an infringement action is brought before the APP, the
alleged infringer could pay the applicable licensing fees to avoid
liability. If he or she refuses, the proprietor of the design could
then seek a preliminary injunction in court; however, the APP
would not have the authority to grant such an order. At this
point, the court could appoint a member of the APP to serve as a
court-appointed master.225 The master would determine
preliminarily whether infringement had occurred. If the master
determined that infringement had occurred, the court could enjoin
the alleged infringing party from further sales of the offending
apparel until final resolution of the case. If the master finds
preliminarily that infringement did not occur, the copyright
holder could, of course, proceed with the litigation in front of the
APP, but without an injunction preventing the other party from
manufacturing or selling the allegedly pirated apparel.226 The
222

Hagin, supra note 12, at 384 (citing Schmidt, supra note 7, at 879

n.136).
223

See infra Appendix § 8(d).
See infra Appendix § 7(c).
225
It is well within the court’s power to provide for a master to make
determinations of fact in areas that are outside of the court’s expertise. See
Aufrichtig, supra note 217, at 176-77 (citing Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S.
48 (1980)). See infra Appendix § 14(b)(2).
226
See Aufrichtig, supra note 217, at 176-77.
224

NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC

7/24/02 11:30 AM

STYLE PIRACY REVISITED

521

parties also could resolve the matter by arbitration.227
As in all copyright infringement actions, it would not be
infringement to make, have made, import, sell, or distribute any
article embodying a garment design created without knowledge of
a protected garment design.228 After proving that he or she is
innocent, the accused infringer would be permitted to sell the
remainder of his or her merchandise and either cease sales or pay
the licensing fees.
Whenever the alleged infringer introduces an earlier design
that is identical or substantially similar to the protected design,
the party alleging infringement would have the burden of
affirmatively establishing its originality.229 After originality is
established, the degree of similarity between the protected design
and the alleged infringing design would be evaluated.
In evaluating whether infringement had occurred, the master
would consider a number of factors. First, he or she would have
to determine whether the allegedly infringing design is an exact
copy of the protected design.230 If it were not, the master would
determine whether significant stylistic features of the original
garment are found in the second. If so, the master would
compare the cut, sleeve and garment length, collar or waist, fit,
and other similar features of the garments. The fabric design and
necessary accessories, such as zippers and buttons, should not be
included in this preliminary evaluation. The final preliminary test
would be a comparison of the overall look and style of the two
garments. If the master believes that, based on the foregoing,
there is a basis for infringement, he or she should so advise the
court and specify his or her reasoning. If the master does not find
enough similarity to warrant a finding of likely infringement, he
or she should indicate the degree of similarity found.231
Should the case proceed to trial before the APP, after the
court has either granted or denied the preliminary injunction,

227
228
229
230
231

See infra Appendix § 14(c).
See infra Appendix § 11.
See infra Appendix § 11.
An exact copy would violate infra Appendix §11(d).
See Aufrichtig, supra note 217, at 180.
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both parties should provide all supporting documents, including
any design drawings, relating to the development of the
respective garment designs.232 The parties also should provide
documents tending to substantiate the period of time involved in
developing and manufacturing the garment. Testimony of other
employees who took part in designing the garment would be
admissible as well. This could provide circumstantial evidence of
the defendant’s independent effort.233
The master’s preliminary evaluation should play a substantial
role in the APP’s and the court’s analysis, should the case be
appealed.234 If the master finds that the defendant developed a
substantially similar garment in a suspiciously short period of
time, or soon after the plaintiff first showed the design (either
publicly or at a private show), the APP should find copyright
infringement.235 Of course, evidence that the design was copied
from a prior work by a third party would be a valid defense.236
A prevailing plaintiff could be awarded the infringer’s profits
resulting from the sale of the copies if it is found that the
infringer’s sales are reasonably related to the use of the
claimant’s design.237 In such a case, the plaintiff would only be
required to prove the infringer’s sales, and the infringer would be
required to prove his or her expenses against such sales. In any
action, the APP may, in its discretion, allow for the recovery of
full costs by or against any party other than the United States or
an officer thereof.238 The APP also may award reasonable
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs.239
Additionally, the APP may award punitive damages as it sees
fit.240 Finally, the APP may order that all infringing articles and

232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

See id. at 181.
See id. at 180.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See infra Appendix § 15(c).
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any patterns, models, or other means specifically adapted for
making the infringed garment be delivered for destruction or
other disposition, as the APP may direct.241
To date, the Copyright Office, the courts and Congress have
feared (not without reason) that if apparel designs receive
copyright protection, other industrial designers would demand
similar protection; they fear the formation of monopolies, which
will cause prices to soar.242 However, implementation of a
licensing scheme should allay this fear.243 Although Congressman
Kastenmeir suggests that “the argument that a particular interest
group will make more money and therefore be more creative
does not satisfy this threshold standard or the constitutional
requirements of the intellectual property clause,”244 copyright
protection for original apparel designs would benefit the economy
and consumers as well as designers.245 As Ralph Brown has
stated, “[W]hen one places the case for limited protection for the
ornamental design of useful objects in the context of other limited
monopolies in intellectual property, the case is not an
unreasonable one.”246

241

See infra Appendix § 15.
Brown, Copyright-like Protection, supra note 91, at 323.
243
A licensing scheme, such as the one discussed in this note, would
greatly reduce the threat of monopolies; designers would be willing to license
their designs for royalties or a fixed fee. See Hagin, supra note 12, at 386.
This would keep the cost of licensed imitations relatively low, and consumers
would still be able to get designer look-a-likes at cheaper prices.
244
Brown, Copyright-like Protection, supra note 91, at 323.
245
A federal law would give the courts a bright-line rule when deciding
apparel design cases, thus providing more consistency for future decisions. In
addition, designers who are afforded protection for their creations would be
assured greater profits, and, in turn, would be likely to create more designs.
Bharathi, supra note 30, at 1670. This would not only increase domestic
revenue for the United States, but revenue abroad as well. Id. at 1669-70.
Protection for apparel designs would also increase competition because the
imitators would begin to create their own original designs.
246
Brown, Copyright-like Protection, supra note 91, at 323.
242
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CONCLUSION
Extending copyright law to afford protection for apparel
designs would benefit society, designers and consumers.247
Apparel designs are no longer merely utilitarian in nature, rather
designers must “creat[e] art to fit the framework of the human
form [that] often involves creativity (e.g., movement, fluidity),
and [demands that the designer] create within the confines of
wearability.”248 Copyright law needs to adapt to changes in
society because “copyright protection for fashion works is crucial
to competitiveness.”249 The current copyright law should be
adapted to protect apparel designs, and the “proposed amendment
better comports with equitable and competitive norms than does
current copyright doctrine applied to this area.”250 The works of
fashion designers should be protected because protecting original
designs would rid the U.S. apparel industry of free-riders, thus
creating a truly level playing field—the very essence of fair
competition.251

247

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219. “[The] encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare . . . . Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered.” Id.
248
See Hagin, supra note 12, at 354.
249
See id. at 387.
250
See id.
251
See Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity,
Unfair Competition, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 301, 313-20 (1986).
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Appendix A
United States Code: Title 17
Other Provisions
A Proposed Bill for the Protection of Apparel Designs
To strengthen the intellectual property laws of the United
States by providing protection for original apparel designs
against unauthorized copying.
Section 1. Designs Protected
(a) Designs protected.
(1) In general. The designer or other owner of an
original design of a useful article, which makes the
article attractive or distinctive in appearance to the
purchasing or using public, may secure the protection
provided by this Act upon complying with and subject
to this Act.
(2) Apparel Designs (also referred to as Garment
Designs). The design of a garment, including the cut
of the fabric and the overall appearance, and not
including the fabric design, is subject to protection
under this Act, notwithstanding Section 2(d).
(b) Definitions. For the purpose of this Act, the following
terms have the following meanings:
(1) A design is “original” if it is the result of the
designer’s creative endeavor that provides a
distinguishable variation over prior work pertaining to
similar articles, which is more than merely trivial and
has not been copied from another source. In
determining originality, considerations should include
but not be limited to the cut of the fabric, the style,
the length and the garment’s overall appearance.
(2) A “useful article” is a garment design that in

NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC

526

7/24/02 11:30 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
normal use has an intrinsic utilitarian function
exceeding the intention to portray the article or to
convey information or an article that is solely useful.
(3) The “design of a useful article,” hereinafter
referred to as a “design,” consists of those aspects or
elements of the article, including its three-dimensional
features of shape, that make up the appearance of the
article. The design must be fixed in a useful article to
be protectable under this Act.
Section 2. Designs Not Subject to Protection
Protection under this Act shall not be available for a design
that is—
(a) not original;
(b) staple or commonplace, such as standard geometric
figures, familiar symbols, emblems, or motifs; or other
shapes, patterns, or configurations that have become
common, prevalent, or ordinary;
(c) different from a design excluded by Subsection (b)
above, only in insignificant details or in elements which
are variants commonly used in the relevant trades; or
(d) dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article
that embodies it.
Section 3. Revisions, Adaptations, and Rearrangements
Protection under this Act shall be available
notwithstanding Subsections 2(b) through (d), if the
design is a substantial revision, adaptation, or
rearrangement of said subject matter. Such protection
shall be independent of any subsisting protection in
subject matter employed in the design, and shall not be
construed as securing any right to subject matter excluded
from protection under this Act or as extending any
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subsisting protection under this Act.
Section 4. Commencement of Protection
The protection provided for a design under this Act shall
commence upon the date of publication of the registration
pursuant to Section 13(a), or the date the design is first
publicly exhibited anywhere in the world, whichever
occurs first.
Section 5. Term of Protection
(a) In general. Subject to Subsection (b) and the
provisions of this Act, the protection herein provided for
a design shall continue for a term of one year from the
date of the commencement of protection as provided in
Section 4.
(b) Upon expiration or termination of protection in a
particular design, as provided in this Act, all rights under
this Act in said design shall terminate, regardless of the
number of different articles in which the design may have
been utilized during the term of its protection.
Section 6. Ownership, Transfer, and Licensing
(a) The exclusive rights in an apparel design subject to
protection under this Act belong to the registrant of the
apparel design.
(b) The owner shall retain exclusive rights in the design
for the period of one month after registration. After said
time has expired, the owner must license the design rights
to any qualified requesting retailer or licensee. Such rights
may be licensed by operation of law, may be bequeathed
by will, and may pass as personal property by the
applicable laws of intestate succession.
(c) Any document pertaining to an apparel design may be
recorded in the United States Garment Design Protection
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Office (“GDPO”) if the document filed for recordation
bears the actual signature of the person who executed it or
if it is accompanied by a sworn or official certification
that it is a true copy of the original, signed document. The
Administrator of the GDPO (the “Administrator”) shall,
upon receipt of the document and the fee specified by the
Administrator, record the document and return it with a
certificate of recordation. The recordation of any license
under this paragraph gives all persons constructive notice
of the facts stated in the recorded document concerning
the transfer or license.
(1) The GDPO shall be responsible for making sure
that copies are being sold only by those retailers who
have paid the licensing fees to copy the particular
apparel designs. Those retailers who are found to be
selling a garment that is substantially similar to a
protected design will be subject to an infringement
action as specified by Section 11 of this Act.
Section 7. The Garment Design Protection Office
Responsibilities, and Organization
(a) All administrative functions and duties under this Act,
except as otherwise specified, are the responsibility of the
Administrator. The Administrator, together with the
subordinate officers and employees of the GDPO, shall be
appointed by the Librarian of Congress and shall act
under the Librarian’s general direction and supervision.
The Administrator and all subordinate officers who make
decisions about which garments shall receive protection,
must have a sufficient understanding of past and present
apparel designs, and must pass a vigorous examination
given by the Administrator.
(b) In addition to the functions and duties set out
elsewhere in this Act, the GDPO shall perform the
following functions:
(1) Effectively decide which garments meet the
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requirements necessary to receive copyright protection
pursuant to this Act and control the registration
process for protectable garments;
(2) Control the collection and distribution of the
licensing fees;
(3) Police stores, the internet, magazines, and all other
possible clothing distribution arenas to ensure that no
copied material is being sold or displayed without a
valid license.
(c) The GDPO shall have a separate department, the AntiPiracy Panel (“APP”), that shall hear and decide claims
of infringement. This department shall consist of lawyers
trained in the area of intellectual property. If a party
wishes to appeal the APP’s decision, the case shall be
brought to an appropriate court of jurisdiction.
Section 8. Garment Design Protection Office Fees
(a) The Administrator shall, by regulation, set reasonable
fees for the filing of applications to register designs under
this Act, taking into consideration the cost of providing
these services.
(b) The Administrator shall, by regulation, set reasonable
fees for the licensing of protected apparel designs.
(c) The employees of the Garment Design Protection
Office shall be paid with the monies received through the
registration process.
(d) A reasonable percentage of the licensing fees, the
amount of which is to be determined by the
Administrator, will be set aside for the compensation of
the GDPO employees.
Section 9. Design Notice
(a) Whenever any design for which protection is sought
under this Act is publicly exhibited, as provided in
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Section 12(b), the proprietor shall, subject to the
provisions of Section 12, mark the design or have the
design marked legibly with a design notice consisting of
the following three elements (the “Design Notice”):
(1) the words “Protected Design” or the letter “F”
within a circle;
(2) The year of the date on which protection for the
design commenced; and
(3) The name of the proprietor, an abbreviation by
which the name can be recognized, or a generally
accepted alternative designation of the proprietor; any
distinctive identification of the proprietor may be used
if it has been approved and recorded by the
Administrator before the design marked with such
identification is registered.
After registration, the registration number may be used
instead of the elements specified in (2) and (3) hereof.
(b) The Design Notice shall be so located and applied as
to give reasonable notice of design protection while the
garment is passing through its normal channels of
commerce. This requirement may be fulfilled through use
of tags affixed to the material.
(c) When the proprietor of a design has complied with the
provisions of this Section, protection under this Act shall
not be affected by the removal, destruction, or
obliteration by others of the Design Notice on an article.
Section 10. Effect of Omission of Design Notice
The omission of the Design Notice prescribed in Section 9
shall not cause loss of protection, but damages or profits
shall not be recoverable under the provisions of this Act
in any action for infringement, with the exception of
actual proof that the infringer was notified of the design
protection and continued to infringe thereafter, in which
event damages or profits may be recovered only for
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infringement after such notice.
Section 11. Infringement
(a) It shall be infringement of a design protected under
this Act for any person, without the consent of the
proprietor of the design, by conduct in or affecting
commerce during the term of such protection, to—
(1) make, have made or import, for sale or for use in
trade, any infringing article as defined in Subsection
(d) hereof; or
(2) sell or distribute for sale or use in trade any such
infringing article, provided that a seller or distributor
of any such article who did not make or import the
same shall be deemed to be an infringer if—
(i) he or she induces, or acts in collusion with a
manufacturer to make, or an importer to import
such article (merely purchasing or giving an order
to purchase in the ordinary course of business shall
not itself constitute such inducement or collusion);
or
(ii) he or she refuses, or fails upon the request of
the proprietor of the design, to make a prompt and
full disclosure of his or her source of such article,
and he or she orders or reorders such article after
having received notice by registered or certified
mail of the protection subsisting in the design.
(b) It shall not be infringement to make, have made,
import, sell, or distribute, any article embodying an
apparel design created without knowledge of a protected
apparel design.
(c) A person who incorporates into his or her own product
of manufacture an infringing article acquired from others
in the ordinary course of business or who, without
knowledge of the protected design, makes or processes an
infringing article for the account of another person in the
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ordinary course of business shall not be deemed an
infringer except under the conditions of clauses (i) and (ii)
of Subsection (a)(2) of this Section. Accepting an order or
reorder from the source of the infringing article shall be
deemed ordering or reordering within the meaning of
Clause (ii) of Subsection (a)(2) of this Section.
(d) An “infringing article” as used herein is any article,
the design of which has been copied from, and is
substantially similar to, the protected design without the
consent of the proprietor, provided that an illustration or
picture of a protected design in an advertisement, book,
periodical, newspaper, photograph, broadcast, motion
picture or similar medium shall not be deemed to be an
infringing article. An article is not an infringing article if
it embodies, in common with the protected design, only
elements described in Subsections (a) through (d) of
Section 2.
(e) The party alleging rights in any action or proceeding
concerning an apparel design shall have the burden of
affirmatively establishing its originality whenever the
opposing party introduces an earlier work, which is
identical to such design, or so similar as to make a prima
facie showing that such design was copied from such
work.
Section 12. Application for Registration
(a) Protection under this Act shall be lost if application for
registration of the design is not made within one month
after the date on which the design was first made public.
(b) A design is made public, either by the designer or
with his or her consent, when an existing useful article
embodying the design is anywhere publicly exhibited,
publicly distributed or offered for sale or sold to the
public.
(c) Application for registration may be made by the
designer and shall contain such information as required by

NURBHAIMACRO4-29.DOC

7/24/02 11:30 AM

STYLE PIRACY REVISITED

533

the GDPO.
(d) The application for registration shall be accompanied
by a drawing or other pictorial representation of the useful
article having one or more views, adequately displaying
the design in a form and style suitable for reproduction
and shall be accompanied by the prescribed fee.
(e) More than one design may be included in the same
application under such conditions as may be prescribed by
the Administrator. For each design included in an
application the fee prescribed for a single design shall be
paid.
Section 13. Certification of Registration
Certificates of registration shall be issued in the name of
the United States under the seal of the Office of the
Administrator and shall be recorded in the official records
of the Office. The certificate shall state the name of the
useful article, the date of filing of the application, the date
of registration and the date the design was made public, if
earlier than the date of filing of the application, and shall
contain a reproduction of the drawing or other pictorial
representation of the design. If a description of the salient
features of the design appears in the application, the
description shall also appear in the certificate. A
certificate of registration shall be admitted in any court as
prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the certificate.
Section 14. Remedy for Infringement
(a) The proprietor of a design shall have remedy for
infringement by means of a hearing in front of the APP.
Parties may appeal by bringing a civil action in front of
the U.S. district courts or any other court of appropriate
jurisdiction.
(b) At the time an infringement action is brought, the
alleged infringer may pay the applicable licensing fees to
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avoid an action. If this option is refused, the designer of
the protected design may attempt to get a preliminary
injunction.
(1) Any court having jurisdiction under this Act may,
in its discretion, grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity to prevent infringement,
including prompt relief through temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions.
(2) The Courts may appoint a master from the APP to
make a preliminary decision about whether the design
is likely to infringe. If the master finds the design is
likely to infringe, the court can enjoin the alleged
infringing party from further sales of the offending
design until resolution of the case. If the master finds
the design is not likely to infringe, the copyright
holder may proceed with the litigation but without a
preliminary injunction preventing the other party from
manufacturing or selling the allegedly pirated apparel.
(c) The parties to an infringement dispute under this Act,
within such time as may be specified by the Administrator
by regulation, may determine such contest or any aspect
thereof by arbitration. Such arbitration shall be governed
by the provision of title 9, United States Code, to the
extent such title is not inconsistent with this Section. The
parties shall give notice of any arbitration award to the
Administrator, and such award shall, as between the
parties to the arbitration, be dispositive of the issues to
which it relates. The arbitration award shall be
unenforceable until such notice is given. Nothing in this
Subsection shall preclude the Administrator from
determining whether a design is subject to registration in a
cancellation proceeding pursuant to this Act.
Section 15. Recovery for Infringement
(a) The claimant may be awarded the infringer’s profits
resulting from the sale of the copies if it is found that the
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infringer’s sales are reasonably related to the use of the
claimant’s design. In such a case, the claimant shall be
required to prove only the infringer’s sales and the
infringer shall be required to prove its expenses against
such sales.
(b) In any action under this Act, the APP, in its
discretion, may allow the recovery of full costs by or
against any party other than the United States or an officer
thereof. The APP may also award reasonable attorney’s
fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs.
(c) The APP may award punitive damages to the
prevailing party as it sees fit.
(d) The APP may order that all infringing articles, and
any patterns, models or other means specifically adapted
for making the same be delivered up for the destruction or
other disposition as the APP may direct.
Section 16. Penalty for False Marking
(a) Whoever, for the purpose of deceiving the public,
marks upon, or applies to, or uses in advertising in
connection with any article made, used, distributed, or
sold, the design of which is not protected under this Act,
a Design Notice as specified in Section 9 or any other
words or symbols importing that the design is protected
under this Act, knowing that the design is not so
protected, shall be fined not more than $500 for every
such offense.
(b) Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event,
one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the
use of the GDPO.
Section 17. Relation to Other Laws
Nothing in this Act shall affect any right or remedy held
by any person under chapters 1 through 9 of title 17, or
under title 35 of the United States Code, or under any
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common law, unfair competition law, trademark law or
other rights or remedies, if any, available to or held by
any person with respect to a design whether or not
registered under this Act.
Section 18. Liability for Action on Registration Fraudulently
Obtained
Any person who brings an action for infringement
knowing that registration of the design is obtained by a
false or fraudulent representation materially affecting the
rights under this Act shall be liable in the sum of
$1,000.00, or such part thereof as the court may
determine, as compensation to the defendant, to be
charged against the plaintiff and paid to the defendant, in
addition to such costs and attorney’s fees of the defendant
as may be assessed by the court.
Section 19. Severability Clause
If any provision of this Act or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid,
the remainder of the Act or the application to other
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Section 20. Time of Taking Effect
This Act shall take effect immediately after enactment.
Section 21. No Retroactive Effect
Protection under this Act shall not be available for any
design that has been commercially exploited as provided
in Section 11(b) prior to the effective date of this Act.
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Section 22. Short Title
This Act may be cited as “The Garment Design Protection
Act of 2002”.
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